Tag: Security

SolarWinds Attack and Access to MS Source Code

Reading Microsoft’s publication about their impact from the SolarWinds hack, I see the potential for additional (unknown) attack vectors. Quoted from MS:

“We detected unusual activity with a small number of internal accounts and upon review, we discovered one account had been used to view source code in a number of source code repositories. The account did not have permissions to modify any code or engineering systems and our investigation further confirmed no changes were made. These accounts were investigated and remediated.”

 

While the potential for attackers to have read something that provides them some sort of insight is obvious, the less obvious scenario would be the SolarWinds attack having obtained credentials with write access elsewhere. Worst case, even inserting another attack vector as was done in the SolarWinds attack. That’s a good reason to establish firewalls with least-required access (i.e. nothing can get to any destination on any port unless there’s a good reason for that access) instead of the internally wide open connectivity that I’ve seen as the norm (even in places with firewall rules defined, I’ve seen servers where either everything is allowed or low ports are blocked but >1024 is opened).

 

 

List Extensions Within Folder

It didn’t occur to me that Apache serves everything under a folder and the .git folder may well be under a folder (you can have your project up a level so there’s a single folder at the root of the project & that folder is DocumentRoot for the web site). Without knowing specific file names, you cannot get anything since directory browsing is disabled. But git has a well-known structure so browsing to /.git/index or really scary for someone who stuffs their password in the repo URL /.git/config is there and Apache happily serves it unless you’ve provided instructions otherwise.

A coworker brought up the intriguing idea of, instead of blocking the .git folder so things subordinate to .git are never served, having a specific list of known good extensions the web server was willing to serve. Which … ironically was one of the things I really didn’t like about IIS. Kind of like the extra frustration of driving behind someone who is going the speed limit. Frustrating because I want to go faster, extra frustrating because they aren’t actually wrong.

But configuring a list of good-to-serve extensions means you’ve got to get a handle on what extensions are on your server in the first place. This command provides a list of extensions and a count per extension (so you can easily identify one-offs that may not be needed):

find /path/to/search/ -type f | perl -ne 'print $1 if m/\.([^.\/]+)$/' | sort | uniq -c

 

Oracle Password Expiry – Sandbox Server

Oracle 11g seems to ship with password expiry enabled — which is a very good thing for production systems. I’ve even written some code to maintain our system account password (scripts are grabbing the password from a not-clear-text storage facility anyway, so it wasn’t a big deal to add an n-1 password and move the current stashed password into the n-1 column, change the account password, and stash the updated password in the current password location … now my system ID password is updated by a monthly cron job, no one actually knows the password {although anyone could find it, so I would run the password cycle script when individuals leave the group}). But I’m a lot lazier about this stuff in my sandbox. Proof of concept code has clear text passwords. But the server is bound to localhost & there’s no real data in, well, anything.

I started seeing lines in my error log indicating the password would expire. Aaaand that’s how I learned that password expiry was enabled by default now.

[Sat Apr 18 07:42:59 2020] [error] [client 127.0.0.1] PHP Warning: oci_connect(): OCI_SUCCESS_WITH_INFO: ORA-28002: the password will expire within 7 days in /var/www/vhtml/…/file.php on line 191, referer: …

I’m going to disable password expiry because it’s a sandbox. For a real system, obviously, this may not be a stellar idea.

select USERNAME, ACCOUNT_STATUS, PROFILE from dba_users where USERNAME = 'SampleUser';

 

USERNAME ACCOUNT_STATUS PROFILE
SampleUser EXPIRED(GRACE) DEFAULT

 

Note the account status “EXPIRED(GRACE)” — that’s why I am getting the error shown above. Grab the profile name — it’s a sandbox, so 99% sure it’s going to be ‘DEFAULT’ and alter that profile with an unlimited password expiration:

alter profile <profile_name> limit password_life_time UNLIMITED;

Except that didn’t actually stop the error. Turns out you’ve still got to change the password once the account has been flagged as expired (or let the password expire and then unlock the account … but I was looking at the log because I’m debugging something, and I wanted the error to stop *right now*).

alter user SampleUser identified by N3W_P@s5_w0rD;

 

The end of password changes?

I knew Microsoft was publishing recommendations against forced password expiry, but it was still surprising to see this banner in my Azure admin portal. It would be nice if their message was clearer on the nuances here — especially that enabling MFA (preferably not SMS-based MFA that is just asking for someone important’s number to get hijacked) is an important component of this recommendation.

In one of my first jobs, I was a sys admin for call-center systems. As such, I interacted with a lot of the call center management and staff … and, when you know someone in IT, you ping them when the proper support route isn’t as responsive as you’d like. Which is to say I did a good bit of end-user support as well. The number of people whose password was written on a post-it note under the keyboard astonished me. This particular call center didn’t have floating seating, but two or three people would share a cube because they worked different schedules. If I’ve got to come up with a new thing I need to remember every 90 days … well, that’s how you end up with Winter19, Spring20, Summer20, Autumn20 or Maggie12, Maggie13, Maggie14 passwords. That then get posted under the keyboard so I can remember that I’m up to “14” now. Couple that with the overhead of supporting password resets for those who didn’t write it down and happened to forget the password. I’d been a proponent of long password expiry coupled with increased complexity requirements. Maybe !Maggie-19? is good for all of 2019. It’s nice to see a major IT vendor starting to realize the real-world impact of IT policies.

Powershell Credentials

I’ve only recently started using PowerShell to perform automated batch functions, and storing passwords in plain text is a huge problem. In other languages, I crypt the password with a string stored elsewhere, then use the elsewhere-stored string in conjunction with the cipher text to retrieve the password. There’s a really easy way to accomplish this in PowerShell (although it does not split the credential into two separate entities that force an attacker to obtain something from two places {i.e. reading a file on disk is good enough} but if they’re already reading my code and on my server … the attacker could easily repeat the algorithmic process of retrieving the other string … which is a long way to say the PowerShell approach may seem less secure; but, effectively, it isn’t much less secure)

The first step is to store the password into a file. Use “read-host -AsSecureString” to grab the password from user input, pipe that to convertfrom-securestring to turn it into a big ugly jumble of text, then pipe that out to a file

read-host -assecurestring | converfrom-securestring | out-file -filepath c:\temp\pass.txt

View the content of the file and you’ll see … a big long hex thing

Great, I’ve got a bunch of rubbish in a file. How do I use that in a script? Set a variable to the content of the file piped through convertto-securestring and then use that password to create a new PSCredential object

$strPassword = get-content -path c:\temp\pass.txt | convertto-securestring
$cred = new-object -typename PSCredential -argumentlist ‘UserID’,$strPassword

Voila, $cred is a credential that you can use in other commands.

Home Security Drone

We’ve conceptualized home security drones for some time with autonomous programming that instructs the drones to return to a charging station when their batteries become depleted. Feed the video back to a platform that knows what the area should look like and alert on abnormalities.

The idea of a drone patrol is interesting to me because optimizing the ‘random walk’ algorithm to best suit the implementation is challenging. The algorithm would need to be modified to account for areas that other drones recently visited and allow weighting for ease of ingress (i.e. it’s not likely someone will scale a cliff wall to infiltrate your property. A lot of ‘intrusions’ will come through the driveway). Bonus points for a speaker system that would have the drone direct visitors to the appropriate entrance (please follow me to the front door) — a personal desire because delivery people seem to believe both our garage and our kitchen patio are the front door.

This is a great security solution when it’s unique, but were the idea to be widely adopted … it would suck as a home security implementation. Why? Drones with video feeds sound like a great way to deter trespassing. But drones have practical limitations. Home break-ins would be performed during storms. Or heavy snowfall. Or …

What if the drone charging base has wheels – during adverse weather, the drone can convert itself into an autonomous land vehicle. I’d probably include an additional battery in the base as the wheeled vehicle traversing land would use more energy. And there would be places a wheeled vehicle could not travel. The converted drone would be able to cover some of the property, and generally the area closest to the structures could be traversed.

Spectre & Meltdown

The academic whitepapers for both of these vulnerabilities can be found at https://spectreattack.com/ — or El Reg’s article and their other article provide a good summary for those not included to slog through technical nuances. There’s a lot of talk about chip manufacturer’s stock drops and vendor patches … but I don’t see anyone asking how bad this is on hosted platforms. Can I sign up for a free Azure trial and start accessing data on your instance? Even if they isolate free trial accounts (and accounts given to students through University relationships), is a potential trove of data worth a few hundred bucks to a hacker? Companies run web storefronts that process credit card info, so there’s potentially profit to be made. Hell, is the data worth a few million to some state-sponsored entity or someone getting into industrial espionage? I’m really curious if MS uses the same Azure farms for their hosted Exchange and SharePoint services.

While Meltdown has patches (not such a big deal if you’re use cases are GPU intensive games, but does a company want a 30% performance hit on business process servers, automated build and testing machines, data mining servers?), Spectre patches turn IT security into TSA regulations. We can make a patch to mitigate the last exploit that occurred. Great for everyone else, but doesn’t help anyone who experienced that last exploit. Or the people about to get hit with the next exploit.

I wonder if Azure and AWS are going to give customers a 5-30% discount after they apply the performance reducing patch? If I agreed to pay x$ for y processing capacity, now they’re supplying 0.87y … why wouldn’t I pay 0.87x$?

Nothing Is New

I keep seeing articles hyping the anonymity of bitcoin-type “currency”. That’s not a new concept in value stores. Non-registered bearer bonds allowed untraceable fund transfers. As bearer instruments are not illegal in the United States, such bonds can still be issued. The holder cannot get any tax exemptions on interest paid for the bond, but you can transact business using bearer bonds. And just like bitcoin-type currencies … you’re screwed if someone takes it. Bonds provide legal recourse – bitcoin, not so much. If no one wants to pay a couple hundred thousand dollars for your bitcoin, you have little bits on disk. It’s like an anonymous stock — it’s worth whatever people are currently willing to pay for it.

As a data storage technique – distributed across the world, redundant, but ultimately meaningless in its sub-components to anyone who happens to have a snippet – it’s intriguing. But as a non-dodgy way of transacting business, it’s just silly.

Apple FaceID

The irony of facial recognition — the idea is that you trade some degree of privacy for enhanced security. There are 10k four digit codes – a 1:10000 chance of any specific code unlocking your device. Apple touted a one in a million chance of facial recognition unlocking your phone.

So you trade your privacy for this one in a million super secure lock. Aaaaand a Vietnamese security firm can hack the phone with a mask. Not even a *good* mask (like I take a couple of your pictures, available online, synthesize them into a 3d image and print a realistic mask).

This feat wasn’t accomplished with millions of dollars of hardware. It took them a week and 150$ (plus equipment, but a 3d printer isn’t as expensive as you’d think).

Boyd v. United States or Riley v. California provide fourth amendment protection for phone content … but that only means the police need a warrant. Fourth amendment, check. Fifth amendment … Commonwealth of Virginia v. Baust  or  United States v. Kirschner says that you while cannot be compelled to reveal a passcode to allow police to access your phone (testimonial) … a fingerprint is not testimonial, it is documentary. And can be compelled. As with a lot of security, one can ask why I care. If I’m not doing anything wrong then who cares if the police peruse my phone. But if I’m not protesting, why do I care if peaceful assembly is being restricted. I’m not publishing the Paradise Papers, so why do I care if freedom of the press is being restricted? Like Martin Niemöller and the Nazis – by the time they get around to harming you, there’s no one left to care.

Security Standards For Financial Information

A long time ago, processors of credit card information didn’t have any standards. And they’d lose your data. People didn’t like that, and some type of regulation had to be put on the industry. The credit card processors got together and formed an initiative to form their own regulations – PCI. They were a lot more concerned with the regulation’s impact on profitability than government regulations would have been. The PCI standards were fairly effective.

And now one of the credit bureaus has lost a huge amount of personal data – including social security numbers and account numbers that I don’t get why were stored in anything other than a one-way hash in the first place. But the bigger question is how are these credit bureaus able to operate with standards that are less strict than the industry-association generated PCI standards? My guess is that there will be a credit bureau industry association writing security standards in the next week or so. If there isn’t an industry association forming to ensure my social security number and account numbers aren’t stored in clear text on web-accessible servers at credit bureaus … I should hope the government would intervene and mandate a certain level of security.