Month: July 2021

Fortify on Demand Remediation – Header Manipulation: Cookies

This is a quick one — putting user input into a cookie is bad — they can throw in CRLF’s and add extra “stuff” into the header

setcookie("ECCKTHistoryCookieSamName", $strLogonUserID, time()+86400, "/sampleTool", $cookiescope, 1);

Strip out the CR, LF, and CRLF’s:

setcookie("ECCKTHistoryCookieSamName", str_replace(array("\r\n", "\n", "\r"), ' ', $strLogonUserID), time()+86400, "/sampleTool", $cookiescope, 1);


Chicken Loss Redux. Redux.

What a week! The Rhode Island being snatched up by a dog kicked off a week of losses here — one of our egg layers, Tilly, died on Monday. She was one of our smaller, cuddlier chickens. One of our hives has no bees. And today another egg layer, Soaring Eagle, disappeared. Hopefully she’s out in the woods somewhere and will be by the coop in the morning. Or she made a nest out in the woods. She’s a Jersey Giant, but our smallest chicken. Instead of growing, she put her energy into being a magic chicken. And she was our very cuddliest chicken. Fingers crossed for her …

Fortify on Demand Remediation – Password Management: Hardcoded Password and Privacy Violation

These two vulnerabilities occur in the obvious case — you’ve hard coded a password or some sort of private info (e.g. SSN) and then printed it out to the browser. Don’t do that! But it also seems to occur quite frequently when Fortify on Demand doesn’t like your variable name. As an example, I have a string that provides a consistent error message when user authentication fails.

I then print the string to the screen when the user’s logon fails. Fortify says I am disclosing the user’s password. I’m obviously not. Simply renaming the variable sorts it. Now … yes, this is silly. But it’s a lot easier than trying to convince someone in Security to manually review the code, acknowledge that something about a bad password error is a totally reasonable (and descriptive) variable name, and add an exception for your code. Since bad password is error 49, I just used that in the now less descriptive variable name [ (1) Not too many people know the LDAP error codes off the top of their head, and (2) there are actually a handful of ldap bind return codes that will print this error].

Fortify on Demand Remediation – SQL Injection

This vulnerability occurs when you accept user input and then use that input in a SQL query. The basic remediation is to use oci_bind_by_name to bind variables into placeholders.

A query using an equivalence clause

The simplest case is a query with an equivalence clause.

The code:

        $stmt = oci_parse($kpiprd_conn, $strQuery);
        oci_set_prefetch($stmt, 300);


        $stmt = oci_parse($kpiprd_conn, $strQuery);
        oci_bind_by_name($stmt, ':ecckt', $strECCKT);
        oci_set_prefetch($stmt, 300);

The same placeholder can be used with the like query. Use “select something from table where columnname like :placeholdername” followed by an oci_bind_by_name($stmt, “:placeholdername”, $strPlaceholderVariable).

A query using an IN clause

– is a little tricker. You could iterate through the array of values and build :placeholder1, :placeholder2, …, :placeholdern and then iterate through the array of values again to bind each value to its corresponding placeholder. A cleaner approach is to use an Oracle collection ($coll in this example) and binding the collection to a single placeholder.

            $arrayCircuitNames = array('L101 /T1    /ELYROHU0012/ELYROHXA32C','111  /ST01  /CHMPILCPF01/CHMPILCPHH3','C102 /OC12  /PHLAPAFG-19/PHLAPAFGW22')
            $strQuery = "SELECT CIRCUIT_DESIGN_ID, EXCHANGE_CARRIER_CIRCUIT_ID  FROM circuit$strDBLink  WHERE EXCHANGE_CARRIER_CIRCUIT_ID in (SELECT column_value FROM table(:myIds))";            $stmt = oci_parse($kpiprd_conn, $strQuery);
            $coll = oci_new_collection($kpiprd_conn, 'ODCIVARCHAR2LIST','SYS');
            foreach ($arrayCircuitNames as $key) {
            oci_bind_by_name($stmt, ':myIds', $coll, -1, OCI_B_NTY);
            oci_set_prefetch($stmt, 300);
Queries with multiple LIKE conditions

Queries with an OR’d group of LIKE clauses can be handled in a similar fashion – either iterate through the array twice or create a collection with strings that include the wildcard characters, then bind that collection to a single placeholder. Create a semi-join using an EXISTS predicate

            $arrayLocs = array('ERIEPAXE%', 'HNCKOHXA%', 'LTRKARXK%');
            $strQuery = "select location_id, clli_code from network_location$strDBLink where exists (select 1 from TABLE(:likelocs) where clli_code like column_value) order by clli_code";
            $stmt = oci_parse($kpiprd_conn, $strQuery);

            $coll = oci_new_collection($kpiprd_conn, 'ODCIVARCHAR2LIST','SYS');
            foreach ($arrayLocs as $strLocation) {
            oci_bind_by_name($stmt, ':likelocs', $coll, -1, OCI_B_NTY);
A query using DUAL

Queries where values are selected from DUAL – In some of my recursive queries, I need to include the original input in the result set (particularly, this query finds all equipment mounted under a specific equipment ID – I want to include the input equipment ID as well). Having a bunch of ‘select 12345 from dual’ is fine until I need to use placeholders. This is another place where the collection can be leveraged:

     select column_value equipment_id from TABLE(sys.ODCIVARCHAR2LIST('12345CDE', '23456BCD', '34567ABC') );

Adds each of the values to my result set.

Which means I can use a query like “select column_value as equipment_id from TABLE(:myIDs)” and bind the collection to :myIDs.

Fortify on Demand Remediation – Cookie Security: Overly Broad

Cookies are tied to hostnames and paths. This vulnerability occurs because not every site is its own hostname – when you own all of*, this is basically a false positive. But, if you host your app on a shared URL (e.g. look at and and … these are three different sites on my home web server. Scott, on is web site, could set a cookie with a path of “/” that uses the same name as a cookie I use on my site – my site would then use the stuff Scott stored through his site. Not such a problem in our scenarios, but a huge problem if you’re talking about a hundred different people’s blogs on some shared domain.

To sort the vulnerability, set the cookie path to something more than /

Fortify on Demand Remediation – LDAP Injection

If you build an LDAP search criterion from user input, it’s possible for the user to inject unexpected content into the search. If I say my username is lisa)(cn=*) or lisa)(|(cn=*) … a filter of (sAMAccountName=$strUserInput) becomes something unexpected.

In php, there’s a filter to escape LDAP search filters – use ldap_escape()

$scriteria=ldap_escape("(&($strUIDAttr=$strUserLogonID))", null, LDAP_ESCAPE_FILTER);

Chicken Loss

Yesterday, one of our Rhode Island Red’s got taken by a dog. I was walking the chickens from their coop into their tractor. Like normal, most of them cannot find the door and walk a loop around the tractor looking for a way in. I get the food sprinkled around the grass and fill up the water bowls while they work out how exactly to get themselves into the thing. I saw a light brown animal out of the corner of my eye behind our large oak tree. My instant thought was “bugger, a baby deer … we’re about to get run over by an upset mommy deer!” — and then this dog streaked over. It didn’t hesitate even when I yelled, it nabbed a chicken, and then it took off into our woods. Now I’ll have to wake Anya up so we have two people herding chickens into the tractor!

Fortify on Demand Remediation – Header Injection: Cookies

Cookie injection vulnerabilities occur when user input is stored into a cookie. It’s possible for malicious input to include newline characters that would be parsed out as new elements in the cookie. As an example, if I send my user ID as “lisa\r\nadmin: true” … I’ve got a cookie that says the userID is lisa and admin is true.

With Fortify on Demand, you cannot just filter out \r and \n characters – Fortify still says the code is vulnerable. You can, however, filter out anything apart from alpha-numeric characters (and, I assume, any oddball character that has a legit reason to be included in the user input):

$strLogonUserID = filter_var(preg_replace(‘/[^a-z\d_]/iu’, ”, $_POST[‘strUID’]), FILTER_SANITIZE_STRING, FILTER_FLAG_STRIP_LOW);

PHP oci_bind_by_name Caveat (a.k.a. a reminder to read the documentation)

This is readily apparent when you actually read the documentation for oci_bind_by_name … but, if you quickly skim through the doc and get mostly what it’s telling you, you can lose data when implementing oci_bind_by_name in your code. That’s because the variable that gets bound into the name is a reference. It’s right there in the description

And again in the more verbose part of the description

Well? They really mean It!

I usually iterate through arrays with for $x=0; $x<count($arrayOfData);$x++ — which is fine because $arrayOfData[$x] is a valid location in memory that contains the data I want. I had a program, though, that accepted user input. Input that frequently contains a bunch of extraneous newline characters in the middle of the data. To avoid making the users clean up their input, I just threw an array_filter on the input. But I don’t need the reorganized data, so I didn’t “waste” the cycles to re-index the filtered array. Instead, I used

for( $itemInput in array_filter( $arrayOfData ) ) {
     oci_bind_by_name($stmt, ‘:placeholder’.$iIterator++, $itemInput);

Which is fine in most circumstances. But, with oci_bind_by_name … the memory address where $inputItem happened to be stashed is bound to the names :placeholder0, :placeholder1, …, :placeholdern – that memory address happened to still contain the last element of arrayOfData I happened to stash there because the server isn’t so busy that memory is being reallocated a fraction of a second later. But this loop does not bind each element of arrayOfData to its corresponding placeholder — instead of saying “select * from MyTable where ID IN (1,2,3,4,5)” … I had “select * from MyTable where ID IN (5,5,5,5,5)”.

In this case you need to use the array index

for( $x = 0; $x < count( $arrayOfData ); $x++ ) {
     $strPlaceholderName = ":inputclli".$x;
     oci_bind_by_name($stmt, $strPlaceholderName, $arrayOfData[$x]);

So each unique memory address is bound to a placeholder.

Fortify on Demand Remediation – JSON Injection

This vulnerability occurs when you write unvalidated input to JSON. A common scenario would be using an Ajax call to pass a string of data to a file and then decoding that string to JSON within the file.

To get around the Foritfy scanning requirements you have to use base64 encoding on the string before sending it through the Ajax call:

var update = $.ajax({
    type: "POST",
    url: "SFPNotesUpdate/../php/validate_notes.php",
    data: { tableData: btoa(JSON.stringify(HotRegisterer.getInstance('myhot').getData())) },
    dataType: 'json'

When reading the input to decode the JSON string to an array you have to perform these actions in order:

  • base64_decode the input string
  • sanitize the input string
  • decode the JSON string to an array
$tbl_data = json_decode(filter_var(base64_decode($_POST['tableData']), FILTER_SANITIZE_STRING, FILTER_FLAG_NO_ENCODE_QUOTES), true);